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CITY OF SANTA BARBARA v. ADAMSON:
NEW PROTECTION FOR ALTERNATE LIFE
STYLE DECISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the California electorate voted to amend the state consti-
tution to add privacy to the list of inalienable rights contained in article
I, section 1.1 In White v. Davis,2 the first case to address the scope of
this amendment, the California Supreme Court identified the principal
"mischiefs" to which the amendment was directed. These mischiefs
were "(1) 'government snooping' and the secret gathering of personal
information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary
personal information by government and business interests; (3) the im-
proper use of information properly obtained... ; and (4) the lack of a
reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records."3
In City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,' the California Supreme
Court declared that the right to privacy encompassed more than protec-
tion from the dangers inherent in the gathering and dissemination of
information. The court suggested that the right to privacy included the
right of persons to make intimate life style decisions free from unneces-
sary government interference. Thus, the court held that a zoning ordi-
nance which defined families in terms of legal and biological
relationships violated the privacy rights of those who chose to live in an
alternate family.'
This note discusses whether precedent supports the extension of
the right to privacy beyond the narrow concerns outlined in White.
This note also examines the reasons for protecting the choice of house-
hold companions and concludes by indicating the failings of the Santa
Barbara ordinance at issue in Adamson.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1977, Beverly Adamson acquired a residence in Santa Barbara,
1. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I reads: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, andpri-
vacy." (emphasis added).
2. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
3. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
4. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
5. Id. at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
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California. The twenty-four room house was hidden from the street by
trees and a fence.' It was located in one of the city's most desirable
sections, commonly referred to as the Riviera.' The Riviera was zoned
exclusively for single-family dwellings. A single family was defined as
any number of persons related by blood, marriage or legal adoption or,
alternatively, a group of not more than five unrelated persons.,
The appellants were three of a group of twelve unrelated persons
occupying the house. On January 18, 1978, they received notice that
they were in violation of the zoning ordinance. 9 The appellants con-
ceded the violation. They argued, however, that the ordinance violated
their right to privacy guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution.10 The appellants recognized that they were not a family
6. The house had 6,231 square feet of floor space, ten bedrooms, and six bathrooms.
Id. at 127-28, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
7. The Riviera was described in the Santa Barbara General Plan as "one of the most
popular residential sections as it affords sweeping views of the city, harbor, ocean, Channel
Islands, and Mesa Hills." CIrY OF SANTA BARBARA GENERAL PLAN at 57 (1975).
8. The ordinance defined a family, in relevant part as: "(1) An individual, or two
(2) or more persons related by blood, marriage or legal adoption living together as a single
housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit.. . . (2) A group of not to exceed five (5) persons,
excluding servants, living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit." SANTA
BARBARA, CAL., MUNIcIPAL CODE § 28.04.230 [hereinafter cited as Zoning Ordinance].
9. "On January 18, 1978, the City Attorney of Santa Barbara informed each of the
residents that he or she was in violation of Code Section 28.10.030 and that they were liable
for a fine not to exceed $500.00 or six (6) months in jail, or both." Defendants-Appellants'
Brief for Petition for Hearing at 2, City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610
P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Hearing]. "The resi-
dents were given five (5) days to comply," which they did not do. Id.
On February 9, 1978, the city attorney filed a complaint for a temporary restraining
order and injunctive relief. A restraining order was issued on March 7, 1978, and a prelimi-
nary injunction on March 29, 1978. 27 Cal. 3d at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
The appellate court had affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the City of Santa
Barbara.
10. See note 1 supra. The appellants summarized the arguments they advanced before
the California Supreme Court as follows:
[The] City of Santa Barbara's zoning ordinance violates the appellants' federal and
state constitutional rights to equal protection and due process of law.
The ordinance also violates the appellants' fundamental state and federal
rights to privacy and freedom of association. The appellants have a constitutional
right to choose their household companions.
The City's ordinance also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by being irrational and arbitrary. The ordinance creates an irrebut-
table presumption that groups of more than five unrelated persons create more
population, noise, traffic, overcrowding and blight problems than do the same
number of related persons.
Petition for Hearing, supra note 9, at 4-5.
The Adamson majority confined its decision to the appellants' claim to a right to pri-
vacy under California's constitution. In a footnote, the court suggested that the result might
have been different under the federal constitution. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3,
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in the traditional sense, but stated that they viewed themselves as the
functional equivalent of a family.1' As a functional family, they as-
serted a constitutional "right to be left alone-the right to be free in the
sphere of private action."'"
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The supreme court framed the issue of the case as whether an ordi-
nance "written to help promote and protect values that family life en-
hances . . . may deny to individuals who are not family members
certain benefits that family members enjoy."' 3 The court concluded
that Santa Barbara's ordinance violated the appellants' right to privacy,
and reversed the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction.' 4
The supreme court's approach in reaching its decision was two-
fold. First, the court inquired whether the right to privacy encompassed
the freedom to live in an alternate family. The court rejected the city's
contention that the constitutional amendment was enacted merely "to
place effective restraints on the information gathering activities of gov-
ernment and business."' 5 Instead, the court, relying on broad language
in White v. Davis,16 stated that" 'the general concept of privacy relates,
of course, to an enormously broad and diverse field of personal action
and belief .... ' "17 Agreeing with the appellants that they were, in
essence, a family, 8 the Adamson court concluded that the right to pri-
164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3. The court concluded, however, that the "federal right of privacy in
general appears to be narrower than what the voters approved in 1972 when they added
'privacy' to the California Constitution." Id. (citing White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,533 P.2d
222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975)). By resting its decision on the state constitution, the court
made further reference to federal precedent unnecessary. See notes 128-30 infra and accom-
panying text.
11. The appellants stated that their "group functions as a family, even though its mem-
bers are not related by blood, marriage or adoption. The appellant family shares the same
values and interactions as a traditional family: love, respect, unity and cohesiveness." Ap-
pellants' Opening Brief at 11-12, Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 90 Cal. App. 3d 31, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 508 (1979), vacated, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
12. d. at 14.
13. 27 Cal. 3d at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
14. Id. at 137, 610 P.2d at 444, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 547. See note 9 supra.
15. Plaintiff and Respondent's Answer to Petition of Hearing before the Supreme Court
at 6, Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
16. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
17. 27 Cal. 3d at 129, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (citation omitted).
18. The court noted that after the appellants chose to live together they became a "close
group with social, economic, and psychological commitments to each other." 27 Cal. 3d at
127-28, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541. The court stated that "[a] living arrangement
like theirs concededly does achieve many of the personal and practical needs served by
traditional family living. It could be termed an alternate family." Id.
19811
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vacy encompassed at least this group's decision to live together.' 9
Second, the court stated that the amendment did not prohibit all
governmental incursion into individual privacy.2" Rather, the city was
required to justify any intrusion by showing a compelling public inter-
est.2' To meet this burden, the city had to demonstrate that (1) the ordi-
nance was intended to promote such interests, (2) the ordinance "truly
and substantially help[ed] effect" these interests, and (3) there were no
means of achieving the interests that were less restrictive of individual
freedom.
22
The court found that the "over-all intent" of the zoning ordinance
was "'to serve the public health, safety, comfort, convenience and gen-
eral welfare and to provide the economic and social advantages result-
ing from an orderly planned use of land resources, and to encourage,
guide and provide a definite plan for future growth and develop-
ment.' ,23 The court summarily dismissed this general purpose as in-
sufficient to justify restricting the appellants' freedom.24
The court implicitly accepted the "more specific intent" underly-
ing the creation of single-family zones-the interest in preserving a res-
idential environment suitable for family life, limiting density and
protecting the area's essential characteristi25--as sufficient to justify
19. The court left open the question of whether the right to privacy encompassed the
right to live with whomever one wished. Id. at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
542-43. The court cited favorably to the dissenting opinion in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting), which stated that:
The choice of household companions-of whether a person's 'intellectual and emo-
tional needs' are best met by living with family, friends, professional associates, or
others-involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of inti-
mate relationships within the home. That decision surely falls within the ambit of
the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
For further discussion, see notes 135-42 infra and accompanying text.
The court in Adamson also noted that it would not follow federal authority because it
appeared that federal law offered less protection to individuals than that provided under
California law. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3. See note
10 supra. In so stating, the court referred to CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 24, which provides that
"[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution." See also note 128 infra.
20. 27 Cal. 3d at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
21. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a compelling state interest, see People v.
Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 730, 591 P.2d 919, 939, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 451 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: .4 Conceptual-
ization andApprisal, 79 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1023, 1074-83 (1979).
22. 27 Cal. 3d at 131-34, 610 P.2d at 440-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-45.
23. Id. at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (citing Zoning Ordinance, sura
note 8, at § 28.01.001).
24. 27 Cal. 3d at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
25. Id. at 131-33, 610 P.2d at 440-41, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44.
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restrictions upon the right to privacy. The court concluded, however,
that the ordinance in question did not "truly and substantially help
effect those goals." 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that
the creation and maintenance of a residential environment was not de-
pendent upon biological or legal relationships among household mem-
bers. 7 The "rule-of-five"2 8 did not limit the density of a given area
because the ordinance did not limit the size of traditional families.2 9
Finally, the court dismissed the city's contention that the rule-of-five
promoted essential characteristics of single family districts by control-
ling less internally stable groups and the concomitant problems of
noise, traffic and parking congestion.3 °
The court speculated that the ordinance might also be premised on
the assumption that groups of unrelated persons present the hazard of
an "immoral environment for families with children.131 The court held
that this method of combatting such a hazard would not be legiti-
mate.32
Additionally, the court held that the ordinance failed to pass con-
stitutional muster because each of the city's goals could be accom-
plished by means "less restrictive of freedom than is the rule-of-five."
33
The court stated that residential character could be preserved by re-
stricting transient and institutional uses; density could be controlled by
regulating with reference to floor space or facilities; and noise, moral-
ity, traffic and parking problems could be dealt with by way of police
ordinances and criminal statutes.34 The court concluded that generally
"zoning ordinances are much less suspect when theyfocus on the use than
when they command inquiry into who are the users. 35
26. Id. at 132, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
27. Id. For example, the court noted that transiency was not determined by the lack of a
biological or marital relationship. Id.
28. The court adopted the term "rule-of-five" to refer to the numerical limit which the
zoning ordinance placed upon the number of unrelated persons who could make up a fam-
ily. Id.
29. Id. The court rejected the city's argument that related groups have a natural limit,
and that by controlling unrelated groups the density of an area could be maintained. Id.
30. Id. at 133, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544. In this regard the court dismissed
the city's argument that traditional families were always quieter, more disciplined, or owned
fewer cars than an alternate family. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr.
375 (1976) (an absolute ban against unmarried cohabiting adults violated right to privacy
because it rested upon an improper irrebuttable presumption)).
33. 27 Cal. 3d at 133, 610 P.2d at 441-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Thus, the court implicitly held that the goals of promoting a family
style of life were compelling ones which a city could seek to effectuate
through reasonable regulations. The city could not pursue those goals
at the expense of an individual's right to privacy, however, unless it
could demonstrate that the regulation truly and substantially helped
effectuate those goals, and that there were no alternatives that would be
less restrictive of individual freedom. The City of Santa Barbara failed
to meet either of these burdens.s6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Scope of California's Right to Privacy
By specifically adding a right to privacy to the state constitution,
the people of California intended that greater protection be given to the
individual than had been provided under existing law.37 It is not cer-
tain, however, that the constitutional guarantee was supposed to en-
compass the right invoked by the appellants. 38 Thus, the first issue the
36. The court concluded that the ordinance was not saved by the fact that it set forth
conditional use permit or variance procedures. Both procedures raised "[t]roubling ques-
tions" because the constitutional attack was meritorious and the procedures gave the city
great discretion to deny the permit or variance, and thereby deprived the appellants of their
fundamental rights. Id. at 135, 137, 610 P.2d at 442-43, 444, 164 Cal. Rptr. 545-46, 547. In
addition, the court noted that the procedure for a conditional use permit would require that
the appellants move to a non-single-family zone. The conditional use permit argument ad-
vanced by the city rested on the assumption that Ms. Adamson ran a boarding house, an
improper use of a dwelling in a single-family zone. The court questioned the reasonableness
of requiring the appellants to move, thus depriving them of the benefits of a residential area
which traditional families enjoyed. Id. at 135, 610 P.2d at 443, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 546. When
the relationship was defined as an "alternate family," the assumption that the living arrange-
ment was a boarding house disappeared. In conclusion, the court quoted the concurring
opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 512-13 (1977), which stated that
"the existence of the variance procedure serves to lessen neither the irrationality of the defi-
nition of 'family' nor the extent of its intrusion into family life-style decisions. . . . We
have now passed well beyond the day when illusory escape hatches could justify the imposi-
tion of burdens on fundamental rights." 27 Cal. 3d at 137, 610 P.2d at 444, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
547.
37. "[The people of California amended the state Constitution to provide explicit pro-
tection to every individual's interest in 'privacy.'" White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 773, 533
P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105. The proponents of the amendment argued that because
there were "no effective restraints on the information [gathering] activities of government
and business," the amendment was necessary to create such a right. Proposed Amendments
to Constitution, Propositions and Proposed Laws Together With Arguments at 26 (Califor-
nia Election Pamphlet, General Election (Tuesday, Nov. 7, 1972)) [hereinafter cited as Elec-
lion Brochure].
38. There is strong authority for the narrow view that the amendment only protects
against the unjustified gathering and dissemination of personal information by government
and business. See, e.g., People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 709, 591 P.2d 919, 926, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 431,438, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979) ("mhe moving force behind the new consti-
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court in Adamson had to address was the proper scope of California's
privacy right.
The majority, relying upon selected language from the election
brochure, concluded that the voters intended to "ensure a right of pri-
vacy . . . in one's family . . . [and] home."'39 The court then asked
whether the right of privacy also comprehended the right to "live in an
alternate family with persons not related by blood, marriage, or adop-
tion."'  This question was implicitly answered in the affirmative, but
without discussion. The legislative history, however, is consistent with
a broad reading of the amendment. In addition, case law supports ex-
tension of the privacy right beyond the traditional family.
1. The election brochure
In interpreting a constitutional amendment, courts are required to
give effect to the intent of the voters who adopted it.4 InAdamson, the
election brochure was the only available legislative history.42 The
Adamson court, in reaching its conclusion, quoted from the election
brochure which stated that the right to privacy protected "our homes,
ourfamilies. . . ourfreedom of communion, and ourfreedom to associ-
ate with thepeople we choose."' In view of this language, the Adamson
court concluded that the voters intended to ensure a right of privacy in
one's family and home.44
The majority's conclusion was consistent with the arguments made
tutional provision was a more focused privacy concern, relating to the accelerating en-
croachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data
collection activity in contemporary society."); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at
233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (same proposition as Privitera); People v. Davis, 92 Cal. App. 3d
250, 260, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (1979) (California's constitutional right to privacy protected
the limited concern of "encroachment upon personal freedom and security caused by in-
creased surveillance and data collection activity."). But see Note, People v. Privitera, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 737, 740 (1980), in which the author stated that it was doubtful that the court
in White intended the narrow interpretation of the amendment contained in Privitera; Com-
ment, The Right to Choose an Unproven Method of Treatment, 13 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 227, 235-
37 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Choose], in which the author criticized Privitera
on the ground that California's privacy right was intended to provide broad protection.
39. 27 Cal. 3d at 130, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (footnote omitted).
40. 27 Cal. 3d at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.
41. Kaiser v. Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 538, 58 P.2d 1278, 1279 (1936); In re Quinn, 35
Cal. App. 3d 473, 482, 110 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1973).
42. "California decisions have long recognized the propriety of resorting to such election
brochure arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and constitutional amend-
ments adopted pursuant to a vote of the people." White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775 n.ll, 553
P.2d at 234 n.11, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.ll.
43. 27 Cal. 3d at 130, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (emphasis in original).
44. Id.
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by both the opponents and proponents of the constitutional amend-
ment. The opponents had claimed that it was unnecessary to guarantee
the right to privacy explicitly because that right was already "recog-
nized by the law and the courts... particularly in the enjoyment of
home and personal activities."45 In rebuttal, the proponents had con-
tended that the right to privacy was "much more than 'unnecessary
wordage'" because it would extend the court decisions on privacy.
4 6
Both arguments suggest that the voters intended that the new amend-
ment protect privacy in areas already "recognized by the law and the
courts."4 7 The right to privacy in one's family and home is one such
area.4
8
2. The case law
The California Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the pri-
vacy amendment in ffhite v. Dapis.4 9 In While the court held that the
superior court had erred in sustaining a demurrer to a complaint which
alleged that police surveillance of university classrooms and university
recognized organizations was in violation of California's guarantee of
privacy. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the amend-
ment was to protect against the proliferation of information of a per-
sonal nature gathered by government and business, which the
individual was virtually powerless to prevent or monitor.
50
45. Election Brochure, supra note 37, at 27.
46. Id. at 28.
47. Id. at 27.
48. Eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (right to live with
members of one's extended family in single-family zone); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (law which forbad use of contraceptives held unconstitutional because it had
a "maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship"); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and procreation were fundamental rights, justifying strict
scrutiny); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to marry, establish a home and bring up children were among the
individual's fundamental liberties); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d 252, 284, 625 P.2d 779, 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 885 (1981) (the decision whether to
bear a child is explicitly protected by the right of privacy provision contained in the Califor-
nia Constitution); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 98, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 380-81 (1976) (the right to privacy includes the right of a parent to live with his or
her child). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (characterizing the right of
privacy as (1) an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and (2) an interest in
autonomy in making certain important decisions).
49. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
50. Id. at 774-76, 533 P.2d at 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06. The court indicated that
the driving force behind the privacy amendment was the voters' intent to prevent snooping.
Looking to the election brochure, the White court identified the primary "mischiefs" to
which the provision was directed. They were (I) the secret gathering of personal informa-
[Vol. 14
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In a footnote, however, the White court indicated that the general
concept of privacy was broad enough to include the privacy of marital
relationships, of one's personal library, of one's financial affairs and of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship. ' 1 Thus, the White court stated
that snooping was the primary reason for amending the constitution,
but recognized that the concept of privacy was much more inclusive.
5 2
The Adamson court adopted a broad reading of White. 53 The po-
sition taken by the A damson majority was that the constitutional pri-
vacy right encompassed not only the right to be free from government
snooping, but that, in addition, it protected "an enormously broad and
diverse field of personal action and belief."54 The dissent, however,
viewed the White decision as laying down the "broad area of concern"
to which the constitutional amendment Was addressed. 5 Extending the
constitutional right beyond protecting individuals from offensive gath-
ering and dissemination of information was, according to the dissent,
inconsistent with the holding of White.5 6
The White decision could be read as consistent with the opinions
of both the majority and dissent inAdamson. It is significant, however,
that the lower courts, after White, addressed the right to privacy in ex-
pansive terms.
In Porten v. University of San Francisco,7 the court held that an
individual's right to privacy was violated when his grades, obtained for
one purpose, were released for an unrelated purpose.5 8 The court
tion, (2) the overbroad collection of unnecessary personal information, (3) the use of prop-
erly obtained information for an improper purpose and (4) the lack of an adequate check on
the accuracy of existing records. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
51. Id. at 774 n.10, 533 P.2d at 233 n.10, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 n.10 (citing Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (privacy in one's personal library)); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy in decision to use contraceptives); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d
415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) (privacy of psychotherapist-patient relationship);
City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970)
(privacy in one's financial affairs)).
52. The White court stated that "[ailthough the full contours of the new constitutional
provision have as yet not even tentatively been sketched, we have concluded that the surveil-
lance and data gathering activities challenged in this case do fall within the aegis of that
provision." 13 Cal. 3d at 773, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105. See note 50 supra.
53. 27 Cal. 3d at 129, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
54. Id. (quoting White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
105).
55. 27 Cal. 3d at 142, 610 P.2d at 447, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 142-43, 610 P.2d at 447-48, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.
57. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
58. Id. at 832, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843. As a result, the demurrer to the plaintiffs com-
plaint was overruled. The complaint had prayed for damages from the University of San
Francisco for sending appellant's grades, from another university, to the State Scholarship
1981]
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noted in dicta that the constitutional amendment was "apparently in-
tended to be an expansion of the privacy right."59 Quoting from the
election brochure, the court stated that "[t]his simple amendment will
extend various court decisions on privacy to insure protection of our
basic rights."6
In Fults v. Superior Court,6 the court held that over-broad inter-
rogatories regarding the plaintiff's sexual relations violated her right to
privacy. In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly recognized "a
well established 'zone of privacy' [in] one's sexual relations." '62
Although these cases concerned problems inherent in data gather-
ing and dissemination, the language used by the appellate courts indi-
cated that the right was much broader. Thus, the decisions support the
broad reading of White adopted by the Adamson majority.
In Peopli'v. Prvitera,63 however, the California Supreme Court
appeared to retreat from an expansive reading of the privacy amend-
ment. In Privitera, the court held that the right to privacy did not ex-
tend to the use of unproven substances in the treatment of cancer. The
court stated that to rule otherwise would be unjustified absent evidence
that the voters, in amending the constitution, intended such an exten-
sion.' The Privitera decision casts doubt on the lower court's dicta by
appearing to limit the scope of the amendment to concerns regarding
the gathering and dissemination of information.65
The dissent inAdamson, relying on Privitera, concluded that there
and Loan Commission despite assurances by U.S.F. that the grades would only be used to
evaluatd Porten's application for admission. Id. at 827, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 840. This case falls
within the third mischief mentioned in White: improper use of information gathered for
another purpose. 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
59. .d. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841. See also Central Valley Chapter of 7th Step Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Younger, 95 Cal. App. 3d 212, 235, 157 Cal. Rptr. 117, 130 (1979) ("The
adoption of the amendment [adding the right to privacy] was intended to strengthen the
right of privacy.").
60. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842. (quoting Election Brochure, supra note
37, at 28) (emphasis added by the court)). See generally notes 45-47 supra and accompany-
ing text, and cases cited at notes 48 & 51 supra.
61. 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1979).
62. Id. at 904, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). Because this case falls within the second
mischief mentioned in White, overbroad collection of personal information, recognition by
the court of an established zone of privacy must be treated as dicta.
63. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
64. Id. at 709-10, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438. Cf. Note, People v. Privitera,
68 CALiF. L. REv. 737, 740 (1980) (White did not intend a narrow interpretation of the
privacy amendment.); The Right To Choose, supra note 38, at 235, 237.
65. 23 Cal. 3d at 709-10, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (California's privacy right
was intended to provide broad protection.).
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was also "no evidence of any kind that the voters. . intended to es-
tablish a 'right to live with whomever one wishes or, at least, to live in
an alternat[e] family.' "66 To further their position, the dissenters noted
that in People v. Davis67 the court of appeal held that the right to pri-
vacy did not encompass the right to use cocaine.68 The court in Davis
stated that "[t]he Privitera court reaffirmed its view of the California
Constitution's right of privacy provision as being intended to protect a
very limited privacy concern, that is, to prevent encroachment upon
personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and
data collection activity."
69
The Adamson majority did not discuss Privitera, nor did it explain
66. 27 Cal. 3d at 143, 610 P.2d at 448, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 551 (Manuel, J., dissenting)
(quoting id. at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43 (majority opinion)). The
dissent also noted that "[t]he necessary condition precedent to the application of strict scru-
tiny, and the search for a 'compelling state interest' which it entails, is the determination that
the right at stake is one lodged in the fabric of our Constitution." Id. at 142, 610 P.2d at 447,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 550. The dissent posited that the majority had proceeded "too hastily" in
finding that the appellants had a right to privacy under the California Constitution. "The
relevant authorities. . . do not support the conclusion that 'the right to live with whomever
one wishes or, at least, to live in an alternat[e] family with persons not related by blood,
marriage, or adoption' is one enjoying of that status." Id. (quoting id. at 130, 610 P.2d at
439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43 (majority opinion)).
67. 92 Cal. App. 3d 250, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1979).
68. Id. at 261, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
69. Id. at 260, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 823. However, two of the three justices in Davis criti-
cized the holding of Privitera. Presiding Justice White stated that:
I have concluded that Justice Scott with his customary acumen has correctly stated
the Privitera court's view that California's right of privacy was intended 'to prevent
encroachment upon personal freedom and security caused by increased surveil-
lance and data collection activity.' However, I do not understand this to be neces-
sarily Justice Scott's personally held view as to the metes and bounds of the right of
privacy. It is certainly not my view. ... I continue to read and understand what
our Supreme Court in White v. Davis [citation omitted] recognized, that 'the gen-
eral concept of privacy relates, of course, to an enormously broad and diverse field
of personal action and belief. . . ' I agree with the observation of our Chief
Justice in her dissent in Privitera, '[t]he right of privacy is a concept of as yet unde-
termined parameters.'
Id. at 261, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
Justice Halvonik was of the view that the case before the court should have been dis-
posed of by citation to Privitera. Everything else in Justice Scott's opinion was characterized
by Justice Halvonik as dicta:
Some of the majority's dicta. . . distresses me ...
I am distressed by the implication... that the right to privacy guaranteed by
article I, section 1 of the California Constitution is essentially directed at data gath-
ering. . . . White did not invite us to concentrate on the single set of facts there
under consideration but to look to the brochure. . . . The argument contained in
that brochure incorporates the conceptual structure of Griswold v. Connecticut (ci-
tation omitted) and the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Oinstead v. United States
'The most comprehensive of rights,' it should go without saying, is profoundly
concerned with more than surveillance and data gathering.
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the apparent shift from the Privitera court's interpretation of the right
to privacy.7" Once it is realized that the California privacy amendment
incorporated existing privacy rights, however, the cases are consistent.
In discussing the right under the federal constitution, the Prvitera court
recognized an established privacy right in making "important deci-
sions" involving "'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education.' ",71 The
court noted that the right had never included decisions involving medi-
cal treatment.72 Adamson, unlike Privitera, dealt with family relation-
ships. The right of privacy in one's family and home is an area which
had already gained judicial recognition.73  Reading Privitera and
Adamson together, it is clear that a majority of the California Supreme
Court is inclined to find a fundamental privacy right in an area which
has been judicially recognized, but is not willing to extend the right
beyond such established areas. Thus, Adamson is consistent with the
legislative history of the privacy amendment and with precedent.
3. Application of the court's reasoning to the alternate family
Having concluded that the right to privacy encompassed decisions
involving one's family and home, the question remaining before the
Adamson court was whether the appellants' "alternate family" was en-
titled to similar protection. In addressing this issue, the Adamson ma-
jority noted the parallels between the Adamson household and a
traditional family. The court stated that the appellants regarded them-
selves as a family.74 Some of the members of the Adamson family had
children who regularly visited.75 When the children visited, they en-
joyed the benefits of the quiet residential area in which the appellants
lived. The court also noted that the appellants were a "close group
with social, economic, and psychological commitments to each
other."76 Like any other family, they shared common responsibilities,
Id. at 262-63, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
It thus appears that the court in Davis, in an appropriate situation, would have given
the right to privacy force beyond the narrow concern argued for by the Adamson dissent.
70. Justices Tobriner and Mosk signed the majority opinions in both PrivItera and
Adamson, although the cases appear to support contradictory interpretations of the scope of
California's privacy right.
71. 23 Cal. 3d at 702, 591 P.2d at 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
72. Id.
73. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
74. 27 Cal. 3d at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
75. Id. at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
76. Id.
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rotated chores, shared expenses and contributed to the upkeep and im-
provement of the house.7 7 They ate their evening meals together and
shared their leisure time with one another.78 The group enjoyed the
benefits of mutual "[e]motional support and stability."79 The court
concluded that the appellants were a family.80 As such, their associa-
tion was protected by the privacy amendment.81
Thus, the conclusion that the Adamson household was a family
flowed from the facts of the case. In addition, the court questioned
whether the right to live with whomever one wished was constitution-
ally protected, 2 but did not answer this question. It is not clear from
the Adamson decision what factors would be critical to this determina-
tion. But the answer would appear to depend, as it did in Adamson,
upon the facts of the case. When a zoning ordinance is drafted in terms
of a single family zone, whether an unrelated group could live in that
zone should depend on how closely the group resembles a family.
In this regard, the court suggested two possible factors to aid in a
determination of whether such a group shares the characteristics of a
family. The first is whether the group is a "close group with social,
economic, and psychological commitments to each other, '8 3 and the
second whether "[e]motional support and stability are provided by the
members to each other ... "84 These factors do not lend themselves
to generalization. It is apparent, however, that the court was looking to
the underlying values which motivated each decision on the part of
particular unrelated individuals to live with one another. The more
closely the values pursued resemble those of a traditional family, the
more likely the decision to live together will be protected by the right to
privacy.
85
Therefore, Adamson is not a radical departure from existing pri-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
81. The Adamson court, while recognizing that the issue before it was whether the right
of privacy included the right to live in an alternate family, id. at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 542-43, never directly answered this question. Rather, the court simply went on
to address whether the ordinance "truly and substantially" effected the city's goals. See id.
at 131-34, 610 P.2d at 440-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-45. However, the application of a strict
standard of review necessarily presupposes that the right of privacy was implicated. Id. at
142, 610 P.2d at 447, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.
83. Id. at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
84. Id.
85. See notes 119-26 infra and accompanying text.
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vacy cases. Under Adamson unrelated individuals cannot live wher-
ever they wish. Rather, in order to be able to invoke the right to
privacy, they must demonstrate that their decision was motivated by
certain important values.
B. An Alternative to the "Rule-of-Five"
Because the right to privacy encompassed the right to live in an
alternate family, 6 the Adamson court placed upon the city the burden
of showing that the ordinance was "justified by a compelling public
interest."87 Yet, the court never addressed the issue of whether the
goals of the zoning ordinance expressed such an interest. Instead, the
court implicitly accepted that the goals underlying the establishment of
single-family zones met this requirement8" and went on to address the
issue of whether the "ordinance's rule-of-five truly and substantially
help[ed] effect those goals."89
The court concluded that the city's goals were not effectuated by
the rule-of-five. The court was unpersuaded that "a close group with
social, economic, and psychological commitments to each other"90
would have an adverse affect on the residential environment of the Ri-
viera. The court rejected the city's argument that the rule-of-five had
the effect of maintaining population density because traditional fami-
lies have a natural limit on size.91 The court stated that the city had not
shown that unrelated groups did not also have a natural limit.92 More-
over, had such a showing been made, the ordinance still only regulated
unrelated groups while leaving overcrowded related groups uncon-
trolled.93 The court also held that the ordinance was an inappropriate
solution to the problems of increased noise, traffic and parking94 be-
cause in a more mobile modem society, traditional families were as
likely to generate as much noise, traffic and parking problems as were
unrelated groups.95
86. See note 81 supra.
87. Id. at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
88. Id. at 131-32, 610 P.2d at 440-41, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44. The goals of the city were
preservation of an area's residential environment, low density, and the essential characteris-
tics which make that area suitable for family life. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 132, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544. See note 22 supra and
accompanying text.
90. 27 Cal. 3d at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
91. Id. at 132, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 133, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
95. Id.
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It is clear from the court's reasoning that the rule-of-five was both
over and underinclusive. It allowed related groups to live in the district
even though they were detrimental to its residential character. At the
same time, it excluded unrelated groups who sought to emulate the val-
ues which Santa Barbara wanted to accommodate.
The court suggested that "a concept more rationally and substan-
tially related to the legitimate aim of maintaining a family style of liv-
ing'' 96 would be to define single-family dwellings as a "'reasonable
number of persons constituting a bonafide housekeeping unit.' ,,97 The
term bonafide housekeeping unit implies use of a common area by all
of the residents.98 It also implies that the use is not merely institutional
or organizational.99 The ordinance would then focus on the use with-
out reference to whether the residents are a family.
Thus, a house physically divided between two couples would not
constitute a single housekeeping unit because it lacks mutual use of the
common areas. 1°° Use of a residence as a boarding house would fail to
meet the definition because of its institutional nature, and a fraternity
house would not meet the requirement because of its organizational
character. 01 The members of such groups are also transient in nature
with new members replacing old ones periodically.10 In each case,
however, it is the nature of the use of a dwelling, rather than the rela-
tionships among the residents, which makes such uses objectionable. 0 3
The Adamson court implied that if a single housekeeping unit
were not involved, the city could regulate or prohibit the use. 1°4 Thus,
while at one point in its opinion the Adamson court suggested that Cal-
ifornia's privacy right might "comprehend the right to live with whom-
ever one wish[ed],' ' 105 it qualified this right when it accepted the idea
that the setting up of single family zones was a compelling public inter-
96. Id. at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
97. Id. at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545. (citation omitted). See also Com-
ment, "Burning the House to Roast the Pig' Unrelated Individuals and Single Family Zon-
ing's Blood Relation Criterion, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 138 (1972). The author of this comment
supports use of the concept of a single housekeeping unit.
98. See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 77-78, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247
(1962) (defining the term "single family dwelling" as used in a zoning ordinance).
99. See id. at 78, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
100. See id. at 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
101. See id. at 78, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
102. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 519 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
103. 27 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
104. See id. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 515-19 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (suggesting the scope of the term "single family dwelling"); Brady v. Superior
Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962) (same proposition as Moore).
105. 27 Cal. 3d at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43. The court found it
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est. 10 6 It would thus appear from the.court's reasoning that a city could
place restrictions upon the right of a person to live with whomever she
wished in a single family zone.
The recent Connecticut case of Prospect Gardens Convalescent
Home, Inc. v. City of NorwalkI 7 is illustrative of how the standard of
the single housekeeping unit has been applied. The ordinance in Pros-
pect Gardens defined a family as "any number of individuals living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit."' 0 8  The plaintiff
owned three homes. The occupants of the houses were twenty-eight to
thirty-one of the plaintiff's employees. The plaintiff sought to compel
Norwalk's zoning inspector to issue approval of repairs which were or-
dered by the fire marshal. The inspector refused, contending that the
plaintiff was running an unlicensed boarding house, an illegal use in a
single family zone. The plaintiff argued that the occupants of the
houses were a family within the meaning of the statute, and that there-
fore, the use was not illegal.
The Connecticut Court of Common Pleas held that the occupants
were not a single housekeeping unit within the meaning of the zoning
ordinance.10 9 The court noted that the employees worked different
shifts and paid rent to the plaintiff as individuals. They were not re-
lated, did not eat meals together, and did not share any factors of "co-
hesiveness or. . . unitary living. . . which would qualify [them] for
classification as a 'single housekeeping unit'."" 0
unnecessary to decide whether California's privacy right was this broad because it found
that appellants were an alternate family. See notes 144-46 infra and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 131-32, 610 P.2d at 440-41, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44.
107. 32 Conn. Supp. 214, 347 A.2d 637 (1975). While the question of whether a funda-
mental right was violated was not at issue in Prospect Gardens, this case is included for its
interpretation of a single housekeeping unit.
108. Id. at 217, 347 A.2d at 640. In 1974, the ordinance was amended to define a family
as "[o]ne... or more persons occupying a single dwelling unit, provided that unless all
members are related by blood or marriage (or adoption), no such family shall contain more
than five... persons." Id., 347 A.2d at 639. The validity of this amendment was not an
issue before the court. See id. at 218-19, 347 A.2d at 640.
109. Id. at 220, 347 A.2d at 641.
110. Id. at 219, 347 A.2d at 640. Unlike the appellants in Adamson, the decision of the
employees to live together was not for the benefits of family style living. Rather, it appears
that the decision was motivated solely by economics and by convenience. The rooms were
close to work, and rented for only $16.60 a week. This does not appear to be a matter of
intimate choice to which the right to privacy should be extended. Cf. Association For Educ.
Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1976). In Hayward, the appellants challenged a
zoning ordinance which defined family in terms of biological and legal relationships, argu-
ing that the ordinance violated their freedom of religion. The appellants were a group of
persons living together because of their religious beliefs. The court upheld the ordinance.
Under the rationale of.4damson, the right to privacy would probably have been extended to
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Within the framework of a single housekeeping unit, a city could
further its legitimate goals by non-discriminatory police power regula-
tions. The Adamson court noted that a city could, for example, pre-
serve the residential character of an area by regulating transient and
institutional uses."' Low population density could be maintained, the
court concluded, by regulating with reference to the floor space or facil-
ities." 2 Finally, the court stated that the city could pursue regulations
designed to control noise, traffic and parking problems." 
3
The Adamson household would not be excluded from the zone
under such a regulatory scheme. The court inAdamson noted that the
appellants constituted a single housekeeping Unit. 114 There was no
overcrowding in the house in which they lived,' ' 5 nor could they be
characterized as a nuisance to other residents of the Riviera. Their
house was hidden from the street, and had off-street parking for at least
twelve cars." 6 The appellants presented no greater burden or infringe-
ment on their neighbors than would any large family." 7 If a single-
family dwelling is defined in terms of a bonafide single housekeeping
unit, then there is no room for the distinction between traditional and
alternate families which characterized the Santa Barbara ordinance." 18
Other unrelated groups which do not claim to be a family would
also benefit from such a definition of single-family dwelling. Such
groups would not be required to demonstrate that they are entitled to
be protected under the right to privacy, but only that they are a single
housekeeping unit within the meaning of the zoning ordinance.
The Adamson court also implied that, as long as a group pursues
the values of family living," 9 there is no basis for discriminating
against them in favor of traditional families. The court cited with ap-
protect their lifestyle decision, because they were a single housekeeping unit and were seek-
ing the benefits of a family lifestyle.
111. 27 Cal. 3d at 133, 610 P.2d at 441-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court noted:
Appellants have built a wall around part of the property and a new, private drive-
way to help isolate them from neighbors' houses. There is no evidence of over-
crowding though, after appellants had arrived, some neighbors did notice a larger
number of cars parked on the property and an understandable increase in the
number of residents.
Id.
118. See id. at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
119. Id.
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proval the New York case of Ciy of White Plains v. Ferraioli!.2 ° In
Ferraloli, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with the question
of whether a couple with two natural children and ten foster children12 1
living in a dwelling located in a single-family zone had violated the
city's zoning ordinance.'22
The Ferraioli court recognized that devoting districts to preserve
family or youth values was a proper purpose of zoning.123 Yet, the
defendant's "group home" was neither a temporary nor a non-tradi-
tional living arrangement. The very purpose of the home was to "emu-
late the traditional family and not to introduce a different 'life
style.' ",124 The court concluded that "[s]o long as the group home bears
the generic character of a family unit as a relatively permanent house-
hold, and is not a framework for transients or transient living, it con-
forms to the purpose of the ordinance."
'1 25
In sum, there is no basis for distinguishing between unrelated and
traditional family households, when both are single housekeeping
units. The unrelated household which shares the "'generic character
of a family. . .' should be equally as entitled to occupy a single family
dwelling as its biologically related neighbors."'' 2 6 Both households may
be subject to non-discriminatory regulations to control problems of
population density, noise, congestion and morality. 27 Thus, this regu-
latory scheme should allow a city to pursue legitimate zoning goals,
without placing unnecessary restrictions upon individual freedom.
120. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
121. Of the ten children, seven were siblings and three were unrelated youngsters. The
house was leased by Abbott House, a non-profit corporation licensed by the state to care for
neglected and abandoned children. Abbott House hired the couple who cared for the chil-
dren. Salary and all household expenses were paid by Abbott House with substantial fund-
ing by the City of New York. Id. at 303-04, 313 N.E.2d at 757, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
122. The ordinance defined a family as "one or more persons limited to the spouse, par-
ents, grandparents, grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters of the owner or the
tenant. . . living together as a single housekeeping unit with kitchen facilities." Id. at 304,
313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451. The issue presented in Ferraloli was whether the
defendant's "group home" fit within the definition. Id. at 303, 313 N.E.2d at 757, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 451.
123. The court stated:
Hence, toward that end [zoning for youth and family values] those uses which
conflict with a stable, uncongested single family environment may be restricted.
High density uses, for example, may be restricted; so too those uses which are asso-
ciated with occupancy by numbers of transient persons may be limited.
Id. at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 305-06, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
126. 27 Cal. 3d at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46 (quoting City of White
Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453).
127. See 27 Cal. 3d at 132-33, 610 P.2d at 441-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45,
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C. The Federal Privacy Cases
The Adamson court rested its decision squarely on the state consti-
tution, with only a passing reference to United States Supreme Court
privacy cases.128 In doing so, the majority stated that the California
right to privacy appeared to be broader than that provided by the fed-
eral constitution. 29 In addition, the Adamson court noted that it was
dealing with a case of first impression in California. 13  Two federal
cases, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'3 1 and Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,132 however, have addressed issues similar to those presented
inAdamson. The Adamson decision can be read consistently with these
cases. Thus, Adamson suggests a basis for giving greater protection
under the federal right to privacy to an individual's decision to live
with unrelated persons.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas133 the United States Supreme
Court was faced with a zoning ordinance very similar to the one at
issue in Adamson . 34 The Court summarily dismissed the argument
made by three cohabitating students that the ordinance violated federal
privacy rights. 13 The Court stated that what was under consideration
was merely economic and social legislation in which the legislature had
to draw lines between what was permissible and what was not.' 36 The
Court held that it would respect the legislative judgment as long as the
ordinance was reasonable and bore a rational relationship to a proper
legislative objective.
137
128. See id. at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3. The court, in prior
cases, had recognized that in the area of "fundamental civil liberties" protected by the decla-
ration of rights in article I, section 1, the first reference should be to California law. Privtera,
23 Cal. 3d at 726, 591 P.2d at 937, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Federal
cases are to be treated as persuasive authority, but are not to be followed if they provide less
protection than California law. Id.
129. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3.
130. Id. However, Privitera suggests that the court will consider whether the "important
decision" at issue is within an area previously protected. See notes 70-73 supra and accom-
panying text.
131. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
132. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
133. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
134. "The word 'family' as used in the ordinance means, '[o]ne or more persons related
by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit,
... A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit.... Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 7-8.
136. Id. at 8.
137. Id. The Court's approach in Belle Terre is consistent with its prior decisions involv-
ing land use regulation. The only limitation placed on the legislature is that the regulation
not be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
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The Court in Belle Terre held that the police power may properly
be used to "lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people."' 38 A limit on the number of unrelated persons who may live
together was reasonable in relation to this goal because it excluded
"boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like [which] present urban
problems."' 39 The Court treated the ordinance as a proper solution to
the problems of more people occupying a given space; of more cars
continuously passing by; of more cars being parked; of more noise
which travels with crowds.' 40
In a footnote, the Adamson majority questioned whether Belle
Terre still enunciates federal law.14  In the same footnote, the Adam-
son court cited favorably to the Belle Terre dissent, where it was ar-
gued that the decision of "whether a person's 'intellectual and
emotional needs' are best met by living with family, friends, profes-
sional associates, or others-involves deeply personal considerations as
to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within the home.'
'1 42
Such decisions, the dissent in Belle Terre concluded, should fall within
the right to privacy protected by the Federal Constitution.
43
health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926). In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), the Court illustrated the scope
of this standard by finding a proper legislative purpose in developing a better balanced and
more attractive community. The Court in Berman thus sustained the condemnation of land
in the District of Columbia for the purpose of ridding the area of slums and creating a more
attractive and balanced community. Given this judicial deference to legislative judgment,
little, if any, protection for the individual can be expected.
138. 416 U.S. at 9.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3. For a discussion
of Belle Terre, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-18, at 975-80; § 15-21
at 990 n.30 (1978), arguing that the decision could be understood in terms of the transiency
of the residents or in terms of the lack of enduring relationships between the student occu-
pants; Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy. Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decision, 64 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1447, 1470 (1976), stating that behind the court's decision "in Belle Terre was
the unspoken recognition that the intimate decision at issue was merely a foundation for a
lifestyle associated with many other decisions that were certainly not private, and almost all
of which were antithetical to the majority views of the community."; Developments in the
Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1572 (1978), arguing, inter alla, that the "Boraas
household was apparently the product simply of the students' desire to live together, and not
of serious economic hardship or the loss of a crucial family member."
142. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3 (quoting Belle
Terre, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
143. 416 U.S. at 16-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Eichbaum, Towards an Auton-
omy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979), arguing that the right to privacy should not be based
on the narrow familial privacy model.
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In citing to the dissent in Belle Terre, theAdamson court suggested
that the right to privacy protected by California's constitution may be
broad enough to protect the choice to live with whomever one wished.
The majority stated that the voters, in enacting the constitutional
amendment, had intended to protect not only one's familial decision,
but also decisions concerning the home.1" If so, then the composition
of the home is a decision which may be protected by California's pri-
vacy right. However, the court avoided answering this broader ques-
tion by characterizing the appellants as an alternate family, 145 thus
bringing their decision to live together under the privacy umbrella.
146
The students in Belle Terre, unlike the Adamson household, were ap-
parently planning to live together only temporarily and lacked endur-
ing familial ties.147
Illustrative of the protection afforded to the family by the Federal
Constitution is the decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.1 4 1 In
Moore, the appellants challenged a zoning ordinance which prohibited
them from living together in a single family residential zone. 149 That
ordinance, unlike the one in Belle Terre, excluded certain members of
the extended biological family from the definition of family. As a re-
sult, Ms. Moore was in violation of the ordinance because she lived
with her son and two grandsons, who were first cousins rather than
brothers.
In Moore, four justices regarded the extended family as deserving
144. 27 Cal. 3d at 130, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (footnote omittted).
145. Id. at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
146. See notes 74-81 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 141 supra.
148. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
149. The ordinance provided:
'Family' means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the house-
hold or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single house-
keeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of
the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such unmarried chil-
dren have no children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of the household.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may include
not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of
the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the
spouse and dependent children of such dependent child. For the purpose of this
subsection, a dependent person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total
support furnished for him by the nominal head of the household and the spouse of
the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
Id. at 496 n.2.
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of special protection. 150 The plurality opinion characterized the ordi-
nance as an "intrusive regulation of the family," and stated that the
rule of Belle Term, with its deference. to legislative judgments, did not
govern.15' The Court concluded that "when the government intrudes
on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must ex-amine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regula-
tion."'
152
The Court stated that the governmental goals of preventing over-
crowding, traffic and parking congestion, and financial burdens on the
school system were legitimate.'53 The Court held, however, that the
ordinance was too broad in its sweep and only marginally served these
goals. 1
54
The Court's concern in Moore was with the government's unneces-
150. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmunjoined. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, but resting on
grounds other than the right to privacy. Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, White and Chief Jus-
tice Burger dissented, arguing that the right to privacy should not be extended.
151. 431 U.S. at 499. See Comment, The Collision of Zoning Ordinances and the Consta-u.
tional Rights of Privacy and Association: Critique and Prognosis, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
155, 161-64 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Collision], where the author gives a history of state
court reactions to attempts by government to control the internal composition of groups
living in single family dwellings.
152. 431 U.S. at 499.
153. Id. at 499-500. While the Court accepted the goals of single family zoning as legiti-
mate, it did not decide whether or not they were compelling. As one commentator has
noted:
Moore did not apply a strict scrutiny test.. . .The test applied by the Court in
determining whether or not the state regulation of the family is constitutionally
infirm leaves ample room for state regulation of family affairs: '[When the gov-
ernment intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court
must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and
the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.' [Moore, 431 U.S.
at 499.] Moore does not hold that the governmental interests urged must be com-
pelling. Nor is it clear that a weighing of the interests urged is required. The
Court never reached that issue because it found that the means adopted did not
serve the ends championed.
Jensen, From Belle Terre to East Cleveland: Zoning, the Family, andthe Right fPrivacy, 13
FAM. L. Q. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Jensen].
154. The Court noted:
For example, the ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife,
and unmarried children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen
licensed drivers, each with his or her own car. At the same time it forbids an adult
brother and sister to share a household, even if both faithfully use public transpor-
tation. The ordinance would permit a grandmother to live with a single dependent
son and children, even if his school-age children number a dozen, yet it forces Mrs.
Moore to find another dwelling for her grandson John, simply because of the pres-
ence of his uncle and cousin in the same household.
Id. at 500.
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sary interference with intimate family decisions. The Court noted that
protection of personal choice in familial decisions was not a new con-
cept, 15 and rested its determination on history and tradition.1 56 It is
through the family that a society's values, moral and cultural, are
passed on from one generation to the next. A concurring opinion
157
expressed a broader concern, lamenting that the ordinance displayed
"a depressing insensitivity toward the economic and emotional needs
of a very large part of our society."
15 8
'The Adamson decision is consistent with Moore. The Adamson
majority noted that the appellants were like a traditional family, in
terms of the values they pursued in their decision to associate.1 59 They
gave each other emotional support and stability, enjoyed the economic
advantages inherent in family living, and developed social, economic
and psychological commitments to each other.' 60 Because the appel-
lants pursued these values, theAdamson court held that they should be
treated like a family.
1 61
The Adamson court's approach is better reasoned than that which
has been used by the United States Supreme Court. In Belle Terre and
in Moore, the Court held that the decision of biologically related indi-
viduals to live together is protected by the right to privacy, while the
decision to live with unrelated individuals is not.162 An unrelated
group, however, may seek the same values as a related group. Thus,
155. Id. at 499 (and cases cited therein). See Collision, supra note 151, at 171-78; Jensen,
supra note 153, at 9-10, where Jensen argued that while cases prior to Moore had stated "a
principle of protecting the family," Moore raised that principle to a constitutional dimen-
sion; Note, Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family: Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
19 B.C. L. Rav. 959, 973 (1978), stating that Moore was both a synthesis and an extension of
earlier cases.
156. 431 U.S. at 503-05. The Court stated that its prior "decisions establish that the Con-
stitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 503. See also Collision, supra
note 151, at 171-78, and Note, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio: The Emergence of the
Right of Family Choice in Zoning, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 547, 571-72 (1978), where the
author discusses the possible extension of Moore to include unrelated "families."
157. Justice Brennan joined in the plurality opinion and stated "I write only to under-
score the cultural myopia of the arbitrary boundary drawn by the East Cleveland ordinance
in light of the tradition of the American home that has been a feature of our society since
our beginning as a Nation. . . ." Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 507-08. The "poor and deprived minorities of our society" were analogized to
the generations of Americans for whom the extended family was a source of social services,
economic and emotional support. Id. at 508.
159. 27 Cal. 3d at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
160. Id. at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
161. Id. at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
162. 416 U.S. at 9; 431 U.S. at 499.
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recognition of a fundamental right should not rest upon a criterion
such as blood relationship.
In deciding Moore, the United States Supreme Court articulated
certain values which make the traditional family worthy of protection
under the federal right to privacy.' 63 While the Adamson decision is
consistent with federal precedent protecting the family, the Adamson
court went one step further. The court recognized that if the values
which make a traditional family worthy of protection are involved in
one's decision to live in an alternate family, then that decision should
also be elevated to the status of a fundamental right. By following the
lead of Adamson, the United States Supreme Court could reaffirm its
holding that the right to privacy protects important individual deci-
sions, 1' 4 and not just biological relationships.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, in deciding Santa Barbara v.
Adamson, asserted that California's constitutional right to privacy is
not limited to the dangers of mass gathering and dissemination of in-
formation by government and business. The right also includes the
right to privacy in one's family and home. Prior toAdamson, this right
had only been recognized for traditional families. Adamson, therefore,
represents an extension of the right. Under Adamson the choice to live
in an alternate family is also protected. A person may now reside in a
single family zone and enjoy the benefits of such residential areas even
though he chooses to live in an alternate family.
The reasons for extending the right to privacy to the alternate fam-
ily are clear. It is through our family life that our "most cherished
values, moral and cultural" 65 are preserved, shared and passed on. It
is from our personal life style choices that we derive both economic and
emotional support. 166 As our society changes and becomes more mo-
bile, the way in which familial values are expressed changes. A couple
may decide to cohabit rather than marry; a couple may decide that
communal living better serves their emotional and economic needs; di-
vorced persons may decide to live together in order that their children
might receive more attention. The decision is a personal one, and is so
central to the human condition as to be entitled to the status of a funda-
mental right.
163. 431 U.S. at 503-05.
164. E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1976), and cases cited therein.
165. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 504.
166. See id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The Adamson court also recognized that a city has an interest in
regulating an area for the benefit of the community. The court sug-
gested that this interest was compelling, and encouraged such regula-
tion. The court required, however, 'that any ordinance be well
reasoned, rather than overly broad in its scope. The court suggested
that the city could preserve single-family residential zones by defining a
single family in terms of a bonafide single housekeeping unit and,
within this framework, the city could pass non-discriminatory police
regulations.
Thus, the Adamson court has reaffirmed the right to privacy as
encompassing a broad area of personal action and belief. In so doing,
it has indicated that the lower courts must look to the election brochure
to determine the proper applications of the privacy amendment. The
exact scope of the amendment remains to be seen. What is clear from
Adamson, however, is that the amendment is not limited to informa-
tion gathering and dissemination. One area clearly protected is privacy
in one's choice of living arrangements, when such arrangements emu-
late traditional family values.
David M. Reeve
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